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Spousal Control and Efficiency of Intra-Household Decision Making: 
Experiments among Married Couples in India, Ethiopia and Nigeria 
 
ABSTRACT 
Given the importance of the household as a resource allocation mechanism, considerable 
interest exists in its efficiency. Most of the non-experimental evidence for inefficiency 
comes from West African farm households in which husbands and wives pursue separate 
productive activities. Using experiments, we test for efficiency of spouses’ resource 
allocation decisions in a range of household types. In North India, we selected households 
that are unified, in northern Nigeria households characterised by separate spheres of 
economic decision making. Our other sites occupy carefully selected intermediate 
positions on the spectrum from unitary to separate-spheres household types. We find that, 
the more separate is decision making in real life, the less efficient is resource allocation in 
the experiments. Moreover, female control of resource allocation tends to lower efficiency, 
in contrast to male control. The exception is a site in northern Nigeria where female control 
of resource allocation is well established. 
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1. Introduction 
People marry the world over, but the nature of the partnership between husbands and wives 
varies considerably across regions. This shows in the ways in which spouses organise their 
economic activities, in particular in the degree to which these take place in separate spheres. 
At one end of the spectrum, husbands and wives act as one, an approximation of which 
may be found in some parts of North India. At the other end, marital partners pursue largely 
separate economic activities, for instance in most of rural West Africa.  
 Do these differences matter for the efficiency of the households run by husbands and 
wives? This is an important question, since a large part of humankind’s consumption and 
production is organised within households. Survey evidence for West Africa suggests that 
because spouses pursue separate economic activities, they could have both been better off 
by coordinating their activities better (Jones, 1983; Udry, 1996; Duflo and Udry, 2004; 
Akresh, 2008). In other words, the fact that husbands and wives exert individual control 
over resource allocation decisions makes these decisions inefficient; a benevolent dictator 
could have improved the wellbeing of both spouses if these would have agreed to renege 
individual control. 
 Of recent, the link between individual spousal control and efficiency has begun to be 
studied in lab-in-the-field experiments; see Munro (2018) for a review of such intra-
household experiments. Spouses’ wishes to exert individual control over money are clearly 
an important determinant of the efficiency of resource allocation decisions. Mani (2011) 
among married couples in India finds widespread inefficiency when spouses choose 
between investment options in which personal control is obtained at the expense of 
household income. The opportunity to hide resources does not affect efficiency in her 
study. In other evidence for the importance of control, Hoel (2015) finds an almost 
universal failure to achieve efficiency in a sample of married couples from Kenya using a 
dictator game in which tokens are worth 20 Kenyan shillings if kept (so under one’s own 
control) and 30 if donated to one’s spouse. Echoeing Mani’s (2011) findings, most of her 
subjects give the same in secret as in public (although a minority gives more in public), 
suggesting that the motive of securing control does not require secrecy to be effective. 
At the same time, the link between efficiency and control appears to differ from culture 
to culture. Using public goods games, Iversen et al. (2011) among married couples in 
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Uganda find that both husbands’ and wives’ contributions (and thus efficiency) go up when 
wives control the allocation of the common pot, whereas Kebede et al. (2014) in Ethiopia 
and Munro et al. (2014) in India find that male and female contributions, when they do 
respond, go down when wives are in charge of the allocation. Husbands controlling the 
allocation has no effect on contributions in the three studies cited.   
For this study, we designed a public goods game for investigating the link between 
spousal control and efficiency of resource allocation decisions. Our contribution to the 
literature is that we selected eight sites purposively on conjugality, i.e. the prevailing nature 
of spousal relations. In particular, we tried to have variation across sites in the degree of 
separateness of economic activities that spouses pursue, from low separateness in North 
India to high in Nigeria, with our other sites occupying an intermediate position. 
We find that the more separate decision-making is in real life, the lower efficiency is in 
the experiments. As to the effect of control, wives controlling resource allocation tends to 
lower efficiency, whereas husbands controlling the allocation has no effect on it. This 
contrast is very striking. We think this may be because husbands’ control over the 
allocation of household resources is the norm in most of our sites (for which we present 
survey evidence), so giving wives such control may be unsettling. Indeed, in the one site 
where giving wives control of the allocation raises contributions to the common pot 
(among the Hausa in northern Nigeria), female control over resources is well-established 
in daily life. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we define efficiency and present the 
experimental design. In Section 3, we motivate site selection in terms of the ethnographic 
record and describe the fieldwork implementation. In Section 4 we present the analysis of 
the experimental and survey data. Section 5 compares our findings with the related 
literature and concludes. 
 
2. Theory and experimental design 
In this section we first sketch in Section 2.1 how inefficiency of intra-household resource 
allocation may arise in economic models of the household, and then present in Section 2.2 
the experiments designed to test for a particular source (spousal control) of inefficiency, 
followed in Section 2.3 by the framework for the analysis. 
  
4 
 
 
2.1 Inefficiency of intra-household allocation of resources in economic theory 
The notion of efficiency tested for in this study is that of the Kaldor-Hicks variety: a shift 
of resources could bring about a situation in which those who gain are in a position to 
compensate those who lose. In other words, when a shift of resources is possible that leads 
to conceivable Pareto improvements, then Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has not been attained. 
Economic models of the household differ radically in terms of possible inefficiency and its 
sources. In unified models of the household (a representative example is Becker, 1974), 
centralised control ensures efficiency. By contrast, in non-cooperative models, introduced 
by Ulph (1988) and Woolley (1988), efficiency is not guaranteed. Central to these models 
is individual utility maximisation subject to individual budget constraints, with 
interdependence of decisions resulting from household public goods and caring 
preferences. Consumption and production decisions are not necessarily optimally 
coordinated and household public goods may be underprovided, the more so when exiting 
the marriage is easier.  
In between these two extremes, there are the collective models introduced by Chiappori 
(1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), which assume Pareto efficiency but do not contain 
much structure besides; and cooperative bargaining models. Some of the latter could be 
seen as collective models with some more structure imposed and the assumption of Pareto 
efficiency retained, such as the seminal cooperative bargaining models of Manser and 
Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). In others, the Pareto property is satisfied 
that the household welfare function is strictly increasing in each member’s consumption 
but neither Pareto nor Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is necessarily attained. Reasons for 
inefficiency in cooperative models include feedback loops from anticipated shifts in the 
balance of power that result from contemplated household resource allocation decisions 
(Basu, 2006); and the inability to make binding agreements because spouses’ commitments 
are not renegotiation-proof (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; Apps and Rees, 2009, pp. 81 ff.).  
Interestingly, the realism of each main class of models is geographically restricted, for 
which ample ethnographic evidence exists (see Section 3.1). We selected sites in North 
India that resemble unified models of the household, sites in northern Nigeria that resemble 
non-cooperative models and sites in Ethiopia to typify relations between spouses that are 
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essentially cooperative but with ample scope for mechanisms that preclude efficiency. The 
site selection thus ensures that we have variation in local conjugal culture. In each site we 
test whether exogenously altering control over the intra-household allocation of resources 
(letting either the husband or the wife be in charge) matters for the efficiency of that 
allocation. The sites are then thought of as dimensions of subject heterogeneity (subjects 
differ in terms of the local conjugal culture) that we interacted with altering control over 
the allocation (in experimental treatments). 
Finding that resource allocation is inefficient would reject unified and collective models 
of the household. However, our main interest is in investigating how efficiency of resource 
allocation is affected by the local conjugal culture (i.e. site), the identity of the spouse in 
charge of allocation, and spousal control and conjugality interacted. Investigating this does 
not constitute a direct test of any particular model of the household. We see this 
investigation as exploratory. We reflect on implications for theory in Section 5. 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
Married couples played variants of a public goods game (PGG) in a between-subject 
design. In the base of the PGG, each spouse receives endowment E, and then chooses an 
investment hI  (husband, wI  for wife) from the set  EEEE ,,,,0 432141 . The contributions 
to the common pot )( wh II   are then multiplied by 1.5 and distributed evenly between 
the two spouses who each receive )(75.0 wh II  .  
We have two treatments that each entail precisely one change from the base. In the first 
treatment, “female control”, the wife decides on the distribution of the common pot. Both 
spouses contribute to the common pot knowing that the wife will decide on its allocation, 
i.e. the wife will decide how much the husband receives and how much she herself receives. 
In the second treatment, “male control”, the husband decides on how the common pot 
is distributed, which both spouses know when they make their contribution decisions. 
The other main design features are as follows. Both spouses are told before they make 
their contribution decisions that the size of the common pot will be known to both spouses. 
Decision-making took place in private. Husbands and wives were escorted to separate 
rooms, were then instructed about the rules of the game, and communicated their decisions 
orally to one of the research assistants, who recorded it for them.  
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Subjects were not informed about the precise size of their spouse’s endowment. We 
instead informed them about a range of monetary amounts in which their spouse’s 
endowment would fall. In practice, in the treatments considered in this paper, the amount 
of money received was always equal to the maximum amount in this range.  We avoided 
deception through taking advantage of the fact that we simultaneously conducted other 
treatments in which subjects received a lower amount. So for example, in the “female 
control” treatment in Ethiopia, wives were told:  
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary between 
people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the envelope.] Your 
husband will receive a similar envelope and he will also receive an amount of money between Birr 0 
and Birr 40. He doesn’t know how much you have in your envelope and you won’t be told how much 
he has in his envelope.  
Since in treatments not considered in this paper the amount subjects received could indeed 
vary from Birr 0 to Birr 40, the information given here is correct. The reasons we wanted 
subjects to be uninformed about the precise amount their spouses had received were (a) to 
give them plausible deniability if they wanted to contribute less than the full amount, and 
(b) to mimic real-life conditions of intra-household resource allocation (see Section 3.1). 
Before spouses’ contributions were revealed to each other, we asked them how much 
they expected their spouse to keep for themselves, so withhold from contributing to the 
common pot. Recall that we did not reveal to subjects the precise endowment their spouse 
had received, so we asked this question hypothetically, e.g.: “If your husband had Birr 40 
in his envelope, how much do you think he would take out?” In practice, we mentioned 
here the actual amount received, which equates to the maximum amount in the range of 
amounts mentioned as possibilities. 
Instructions were orally delivered and read out from a script. These scripts were 
identical in each of the eight sites. They were translated into the local language and then 
back-translated in order to check that the intended meanings had survived the process of 
translation. The experimental instructions as delivered to subjects in the “female control” 
treatment in Ethiopia are presented in the online appendix. Instructions for other treatments 
and other sites are straightforward adaptations of these appended instructions. 
Monetary incentives were sufficient. Endowments were calibrated to be equal to twice 
the local daily wage for semi-skilled labour. 
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Married couples were randomly assigned to treatments. Moreover, each treatment was 
played in every session, and each couple participated in one game version only, i.e. in the 
base version of the game or in “female control” or in “male control”. 
 
2.3 Framework for the analysis 
The bulk of the analysis is simple comparison-of-means tests of investment 𝐼𝑝, 𝑝 = ℎ, 𝑤 in 
the base version of the PGG, 𝑇0, and treatment 𝑇𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2 in site 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0,1, … ,7. We use 
two-sample two-sided t-tests for these comparisons, and a non-parametric alternative, i.e. 
Mann-Whitney, to check for the influence of distributional assumptions on the test statistic. 
In order to control for inadvertent sub-sample heterogeneity and session-level influence 
on behaviour, we condition on control variables cX  in the estimation framework provided 
by Equation (1), whose parameters may differ between husbands and wives. 
 
ikjkjjj
c
iii TSSXI    ,00     (1) 
 
The focus of the analysis is on whether conditional on site S, treatment T varies in its effect 
on subject’s i  investment Ii (contribution to the common pot). There are three game version 
dummies 𝑇𝑘, including base version 𝑇0 and two treatment dummies, and eight site dummies 
𝑆𝑗 with 𝑆0 being the reference site. 0  is mean investment in reference site 0S  in the base 
version of the PGG, 
00  j  is mean investment in the base of the PGG in site j, and 
kjj ,00     is mean investment in treatment k in site j, controlling for observed 
subject/couple characteristics cX : expectations about a spouse’s contributions, features of 
the marriage, and so forth.  The null hypothesis that treatment effects are uniform across 
sites, i.e. 𝜏𝑗,𝑘 = 0 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑘 is tested first using simple OLS of (1); next using tobit to check 
whether it matters that the dependent variable is left and right censored; and finally using 
ordered probit to check whether it matters that the dependent variable is not continuous. 
i  is a person-specific unobserved effect, which may include unobserved features of the 
couple, with overall mean 0  and conditional means 0||  jk ST  . In the 
estimation, we cluster standard errors by session and correct for heteroscedasticity. 
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3. Site selection and fieldwork implementation 
 
3.1 Site selection 
For the purpose of this study, we have tried to obtain variation across sites in the 
separateness of spouses’ economic activities. Our site selection strategy has been to 
purposively select sites that according to ethnographic literature could be taken to resemble 
various economic models of the household. In unitary models of the household (e.g. 
Becker, 1974), control of resources is centralised. We selected sites in North India to 
exemplify this, with arranged marriages, practically no divorce and female subordination 
to the male household head (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001). 
By contrast, in non-cooperative models (introduced by Ulph, 1988, and Woolley, 1988), 
consumption and production decisions are not necessarily optimally coordinated, the more 
so when exiting the marriage is easier. West African farming households are often cited as 
examples of husbands and wives forming separate consumption and production units (e.g. 
Hill, 1975; Tambiah, 1989). We selected sites in northern Nigeria, with frequent divorce 
and intra-household spheres of economic activities clearly demarcated along gender lines, 
to resemble non-cooperative models (Hill, 1972; Jackson, 1978; Pittin, 2002). 
In between the extremes of unitary and non-cooperative models, there are cooperative 
bargaining models (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and 
Pollak, 2003). We selected sites in Ethiopia to typify relations between spouses that are 
essentially cooperative but with obvious and ample scope for mechanisms that preclude 
efficiency. Unlike the dominant pattern in West African farm households of separate 
production units, the typical agricultural production system in Ethiopia is one of separate 
tasks for men and women in a joint agricultural enterprise (Seebens and Sauer, 2007). 
However, women frequently undertake extra activities for additional income and men are 
responsible for selling crops: despite extensive consultation of husbands and wives on 
agricultural matters being common, evidence exists of spouses’ substantial hiding of 
income from each other (Frank, 1999). 
We thus selected sites that differ in terms of degree of separation of spouses in economic 
activities, with those in North India representing jointness, those in northern Nigeria 
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separateness, and those in Ethiopia an intermediate regime. For more nuance, we added 
within-country contrasts and ended up with the following eight sites, each of which is 
denoted using a short acronym (e.g. UPR).  
In India, in addition to a rural site in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (UPR), we 
selected a southern rural site, in Tamil Nadu (TAM), to capture the greater female 
autonomy in the South compared to the North (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Jejeebhoy, 2001; 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001) and therefore scope for separate activities.   
In northern Nigeria, in the Emirate of Kano, we selected the Hausa (HAU) people, 
whose women, despite female seclusion, are from their homesteads very active traders, 
highly independent and involved in activities entirely separate from those of their 
husbands, with whom they have a transactional relationship that often involves monetary 
payments (Hill, 1972; Jackson, 1978; Pittin, 2002). In contrast, we also selected in the same 
part of Nigeria a site where pre-Muslim Hausa, the Maguzawa (MAG), reside, albeit in 
dwindling numbers (Clough, 2009). Among them, a wife is typically given a plot to 
cultivate by her husband, but also joins him to work on the gandu (ancestral land), along 
with his married sons and their wives (Greenberg, 1946; Abdulwahid, 2006). Separation is 
thus not nearly as extreme among the Maguzawa as it is among the Hausa.  
In Ethiopia, we sought to achieve a similar contrast in rural sites in terms of relative 
female involvement in the household’s farm, to capture degree of separation of spouses in 
economic activities, based on the broadly accurate pattern of a larger female agricultural 
role in plough than in hoe economies (Boserup, 1970; Alesina et al., 2011). Representing 
plough economies and thus a greater degree of separation between spouses is our rural site 
of Mehal Meda (MHM), in the north of the country, and the hoe economies that of Hadiya 
(HAD), in the south.  
Finally, to capture a potential dilution of traditional contrasts under the influence of 
modernity, we selected two urban sites, one in India, Varanasi (VAR) in Uttar Pradesh (so 
in the same state as our rural site in North India) and the other the capital of Ethiopia, Addis 
Ababa (ADI). 
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3.2 Sample selection and fieldwork implementation 
The details of sample selection and fieldwork implementation in each of our eight sites are 
presented in detail in AUTHORS (2014a,b, 2018). Here we briefly summarise them. With 
the help of key informants, we purposively selected in every site a typical region (e.g. a 
district) and in every region five clusters of villages (wards in urban areas) in which game 
sessions could be organised, sufficiently far apart to avoid cross-contamination.  
In each cluster, we took a census of all married couples, which provided us with a 
sampling frame. Couples were randomly selected and randomly replaced in case of non-
availability (which was rare), of which we kept a record. The total sample in our eight sites 
consisted of 3,068 married couples, of which 965 couples were randomly assigned to the 
treatments considered in this paper (see Section 4.2). We report on other treatments in 
AUTHORS (2014a,b, 2018). 
For each treatment played in a site we thus had five sessions (one per cluster), and across 
all sites, eight sites times five sessions equals forty sessions in total.  
In the weeks that followed a game session, a survey was administered among all 
husbands and wives who participated in the experiments. Both spouses were interviewed, 
each by a separate interviewer and with the other spouse not present whenever possible 
(we recorded who were present during the interview). Husbands and wives were asked an 
overlapping but distinct set of questions about their socio-economic characteristics, role in 
the household, relevant values and freedoms, marital history, and details about their 
relations with their spouse and their kinsfolk.   
 
4. Results 
In this section, we first present subject characteristics by site (Section 4.1), followed by 
information on assignment to treatment and balancing tests (Section 4.2), aggregate 
patterns of behaviour in the experimental games (Section 4.3), and an analysis of behaviour 
in the games through comparisons of mean female and male contributions by treatment and 
site, first without (Section 4.4) and then controlling for socio-economic characteristics 
(Section 4.5). 
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4.1 Subject characteristics  
Conjugality indicators by site are presented in Table 1, which is based on the 965 married 
couples assigned to the treatments considered in this paper. A clear India/Africa contrast 
can be observed in the incidence of arranged marriage, as well as divorce. The incidence 
of arranged marriage ranges from 85 per cent to 94 per cent across the three Indian sites, 
and from 4 to 23 per cent across the five African sites. As to divorce, it is very rare for 
husbands in the Indian sites to have been married more than once: the mean number of 
times they have been married ranges from 1.00 to 1.05. By contrast, across the African 
sites, the number of times husbands have been married ranges from 1.08 to 1.61. These 
figures for divorce and arranged marriage are consistent with the reason we had selected 
sites both in India and in Africa. We had expected both marriage of spouses’ own volition 
and divorce to be more frequent in Africa than in India, which is confirmed here. 
A second motive for site selection is variation in female economic independence. Our 
purpose was to encourage such variation both through the East Africa/West Africa and 
through the North India/South India contrast. In line with this, women are much more 
frequently primarily homemakers (responsible for household chores so as a rule not 
economically independent) in our East African than in our West African, and in our North 
Indian than in our South Indian sites. In the Ethiopian sites, 64 – 74 per cent of wives are 
primarily homemakers, whereas across the Nigerian sites, this figure ranges from 7 to 23 
per cent. In North India, 46 per cent of wives are homemakers in rural Uttar Pradesh and 
58 per cent in Varanasi; in rural Tamil Nadu the figure is as low as 16 per cent.  
On another indicator of (absence of) female economic independence, the inability to 
make independent consumption decisions, the East vs. West Africa contrast is again 
confirmed, but the North vs. South India contrast is not. The percentage of wives who need 
permission to buy a dress is, as expected, much higher in our East African (almost 90 per 
cent) rural sites than in the West African ones (21 – 42 per cent). However, 68 per cent of 
wives in rural Tamil Nadu in South India need permission to buy a sari, whereas the 
corresponding figures for rural and urban (Varanasi) Uttar Pradesh are 47 and 42 per cent, 
respectively. For very similar deviations from the previously expected North/South India 
contrast in female autonomy in spending decisions, see Rahan and Rao (2004). 
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For comparison with the related literature, we also report how often wives primarily 
decide on spending household income. Unlike in South East Asia, where female control 
over household finances is common and held responsible for husbands hiding resources 
from their wives (Ashraf, 2009), women deciding on how household income is spent is 
always rare in our sites: never more than 15 per cent and usually considerably lower.  
Overall, the contrasts in conjugality indicators observed here are broadly consistent with 
the expected differences in wives’ independence and control over resources – greater in 
West than in East Africa, in Africa than in India, and (with the exception of personal 
consumption) in South than in North India. This suggests a low degree of separation 
between spouses in economic activities in India – especially North India, a high degree of 
such separation in northern Nigeria, and an intermediate degree in Ethiopia, which is 
consistent with our motives for site selection presented in Section 3.1. Put cautiously, site 
selection clearly has produced substantial between-site variation in conjugality, which is 
broadly in line with the ethnographic record. 
 
4.2 Assignment to treatment 
As outlined in Section 3.2, the sample of 965 married couples of interest in this study is 
drawn from a larger sample of 3,068 couples, about equally distributed across the eight 
sites. The couples were randomly assigned to treatments, so that for any treatment 
conducted in a site, each couple has the same chance of taking part in that treatment. Our 
original plan was to assign 40 couples per site to each treatment. We deviated from that 
plan only in one instance, among the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria, where 45 couples 
were assigned to the base version of the experimental game. This was done for pragmatic 
reasons.1 Table 2 shows the distribution of the 965 married couples across the treatments 
and sites. 
In each session conducted in a site, all three treatments were played, so that random 
assignment to treatment took place at the level of the couple. We investigated inadvertent 
selection due to chance, and found this to be unproblematic. 
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4.3 Aggregate patterns of behaviour in the experimental games 
Table 3 contains summary statistics by site of variables capturing contribution and 
allocation behaviour in the experimental games, as well as expectations of spouses’ 
behaviour. Female contributions range from 44 per cent of endowments in Mehal Meda, a 
rural site in Ethiopia, to 64 per cent in Varanasi, our urban site in North India. On average, 
wives contribute 52 per cent of endowments. Male contributions range from 44 per cent 
among the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria to 63 per cent in Varanasi. On average, husbands 
contribute 56 per cent of endowments: somewhat higher than wives’ contributions, which 
is also the case in six out of our eight sites (exceptions are the Maguzawa and Varanasi). 
When female and male contributions are combined, in order to obtain a measure of 
efficiency of intra-household decision making, contributions range from 47 per cent among 
the Maguzawa to 64 per cent in Varanasi. Among the Maguzawa this implies inefficiency 
of about 18 per cent: 53 per cent of endowments are not contributed so household earnings 
are (.47 ∗ 1.5 + .53)/1.5 ≈ 82 per cent of what they could have been. In Varanasi, 
inefficiency is about 12 per cent. As may be seen in Table 3, efficiency is highest in urban 
North India, lowest in our two West African sites, and in between these extremes in our 
other sites. 
Wives’ expectations of how much husbands would withhold from contributing to the 
common pot were 50 per cent of endowments on average. In reality, husbands withheld 44 
per cent on average (100 – 56 per cent contributed), so wives somewhat overestimated how 
much husbands would withhold. Wives’ expectations of husbands withholding ranged 
from 39 per cent in Varanasi to 60 per cent in Hadiya in rural Ethiopia. 
 Husbands’ expectations of wives withholding endowments ranged from 42 per cent in 
rural Tamil Nadu, in South India, to 53 per cent among the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria. 
The average expectations of withholding 47 per cent were close to the actual of 48 per cent. 
We will make use of expectations of spousal contributions in the regression analysis of 
contribution behaviour (Section 4.5). 
We do not focus on allocation behaviour in this paper. The reasons are, first, that these 
allocations can be undone after the experiment, which we do not observe. Second, we do 
not know what the money will be spent on: household goods, private goods, gifts to 
household members, gifts to others, and so forth. For that reason we cannot equate 
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experimental receipts with ultimate benefits. Third, and related, spouses may influence 
each other’s spending. In an extreme case of power imbalance, the dominant spouse could 
simply instruct their partner what to spend the money received in the experiment on. 
By contrast, money not contributed to the common pot could have earned interest that 
is voluntarily forfeited. This represents an efficiency loss that cannot be regained after the 
experiment. Contribution behaviour is therefore final in a sense that allocation behaviour 
is not. We will next analyse how contribution behaviour responds to the identity of the 
spouse in charge of allocation of the common pot. 
 
4.4 Contributions to the common pot by treatment 
Figure 1 displays male and female contribution rates (as a percentage of endowments) by 
treatment and site. Comparing contribution behaviour in the “female control” treatment 
with that in the base version of the experiment shows that in six out of eight sites, female 
contributions are lower in the “female control” treatment than in the base, and in two sites 
higher. In that same treatment, so when wives control the allocation of the common pot, 
male contributions are lower than in the base in seven out of eight sites, and higher in one. 
On the face of it, “male control” suppresses contributions somewhat less than “female 
control”. In four out of eight sites, “male control” lowers female contributions, and in the 
other four it raises them, compared to the base. When men control the allocation of the 
common pot, male contributions are lower than in the base in five out of eight sites, and 
higher in the remaining three. 
It is striking that when spouses are in charge of the allocation of the common pot, they 
do not contribute their entire endowment, with own contribution rates among those in 
charge of allocation even frequently being lower than in the base. This raises the question 
why, when individuals can secure a positive return on investment by allocating to 
themselves a commensurate share of the common pot, they do not do so. Perhaps 
endowment (secretly) retained is regarded differently from money allocated to oneself from 
the common pot; this needs investigation in future research. 
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“Female control” treatment effects 
We next turn to testing whether treatment effects are significant. In Table 4, female 
contributions, male contributions and household efficiency (male contributions plus female 
contributions) are compared between the “female control” and the base version of the 
game, by site. For assessing statistical significance, we use a two-sided two-sample t-test, 
and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, a non-parametric alternative based on the order in which 
the observations from the two samples fall. We use a non-parametric alternative to the t-
test to check for the influence of distributional assumptions on the test statistic. 
To begin with female contributions in the “female control” treatment, these are 
significantly lower than in the base, by between 15 and 20 percentage points, in three sites: 
Varanasi, Mehal Meda and Hadiya. Varanasi in North India was selected because it 
represents centralised male control over intra-household resource allocation, whereas the 
two rural Ethiopian sites represent, to differing degrees, intermediate regimes between 
separate spheres and unified decision making: men and women pursue some joint 
agricultural activities but also some separate income-earning activities. 
When it comes to husbands’ contributions, “female control” lowers these statistically 
significantly, compared to the base, in Varanasi (by 19 percentage points) and in Hadiya 
(by 12 percentage points); it raises them among the Maguzawa (by 8 percentage points). 
When controlling for socio-economic characteristics (Table 6), the treatment effect of 
“female control” retains statistical significance for Varanasi (both for male and female 
contributions), for female contributions in Mehal Meda, and for male contributions in 
Hadiya; both the effect on female contributions for Hadiya, and the effect on male 
contributions among the Maguzawa lose significance, which we therefore do not think of 
as robust treatment effects. 
 We summarise the robust treatment effects in two results. 
 
Result 1. Female control over the intra-household allocation of resources lowers female 
contributions in two out of eight sites. They are Varanasi, a city in North India selected to 
represent centralised male control of household resources; and Mehal Meda, a site in rural 
Ethiopia in which husbands and wives farm together while also controlling their own 
independent income streams. 
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Result 2. Female control lowers male contributions in two out of eight sites. They are 
Varanasi and Hadiya. Hadiya like Mehal Meda is characterised by a mixture of joint 
agriculture and spouses’ separate pursuit of income-earning activities; the difference with 
Mehal Meda is that women’s involvement in agriculture is traditionally greater. 
 
As a result of the suppressing effect on male or female contributions, the combined effect 
is statistically significant in each of the three sites featured so far: male plus female 
contributions as a percentage of endowments go down by 19 percentage points in Varanasi, 
10 percentage points in Mehal Meda, and 15 percentage points in Hadiya. The combined 
effect, although small (6 percentage points) is significant in rural Tamil Nadu, in South 
India, too. We sum this up in our third result. 
 
Result 3. Female control lowers efficiency of intra-household resource allocation in four 
out of eight sites, two of them in India, and two in rural Ethiopia. 
 
In marked contrast to the suppressing effects on contributions commented on so far, the 
“female control” treatment significantly raises female contributions, by 10 percentage 
points, in Hausaland. This treatment effect is robust to controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics (Table 6) and is thus an instance of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
Interestingly, the one site where female control significantly raises female contributions is 
also the one site where the ethnographic record is one of wives being firmly in charge of 
substantial independent income streams (Hill, 1969, 1972; Jackson, 1978; Schildkrout, 
1982; Pittin, 2002). The fact that more control does not apparently give women (with the 
exception of the Hausa) the confidence to contribute more to the household, is worth 
noting. We summarise this finding for the Hausa in the next result. 
 
Result 4. Female control raises female contributions in one out of eight sites. This is among 
the Hausa in rural northern Nigeria, the site where female control over resources is most 
firmly established. 
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As implied above, this result does not carry through to male plus female contributions, so 
to household efficiency being significantly higher.  
 
“Male control” treatment effects 
In marked contrast to “female control”, “male control” has little effect on either male or 
female contributions (Table 5). The apparent effect in Mehal Meda on female contributions 
is significant at the 10 per cent level only in the case of the t-test; and loses statistical 
significance when socio-economic characteristics are controlled for (Table 6). Likewise, 
the apparent effect in Varanasi on male contributions is significant at the 10 per cent level 
in the case of both tests reported in Table 5, and is no longer significant in Table 6. The 
combined effect (male plus female contributions) is never consistently significant at the 5 
per cent level either (Table 5). We summarise as follows. 
 
Result 5. Male control over the intra-household allocation of resources has no robust 
effects in any of our eight sites on female contributions to a household public good, nor on 
male contributions nor on the efficiency of intra-household resource allocation. 
 
Before discussing the effects of socio-economic characteristics on spousal contributions, 
one implication of the findings discussed so far is worth spelling out. For neither of the two 
treatments in any of our eight sites does efficiency ever increase compared to the base 
version of the game. A simple 50/50 allocation rule is never outperformed by leaving the 
allocation of the common pot to either spouse: male plus female contributions are in four 
cases significantly lower (all four in the “female control” treatment) but never significantly 
higher than in the base version of the game. This gives rise to our next result. 
 
Result 6. Neither “male control” nor “female control”, compared to the base version of 
the game, raises efficiency of intra-household resource allocation in any of our eight sites. 
 
4.5 Regression analysis 
In Table 6, the results of estimating Eq. (1) are reported, using tobit regressions.2 We 
first comment on site dummies. The coefficients on site dummies are potentially influenced 
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by confounds such as different experimenter teams, which is why we focus in the paper on 
the performance of the treatment effects by site: treatment times site dummies in the 
regression analysis have been commented on above, and have informed the results 
presented there. The coefficients on site dummies are nonetheless suggestive. 
 All coefficients on site dummies are positive, suggesting higher contributions than in 
the reference site, among the Hausa. For male contributions, only Varanasi is statistically 
significant. For female contributions, Varanasi, rural Tamil Nadu and all three Ethiopian 
site dummies are statistically significant. The contrast is quite striking. Conditional on 
subject characteristics, female contributions are statistically significantly higher in five 
sites in India and Ethiopia than among the Hausa in northern Nigeria; male contributions 
only in one site (Varanasi). 
 When it comes to the role of expectations, these have a sizeable and statistically 
significant effect on contributions. The coefficient of .3350 on wives’ expectations of 
husbands contributing implies that for every ten percentage points increase in expectations 
of contributions, own contributions increase by 3.35 percentage points. On average wives 
expect husbands to contribute 50 per cent of endowments, whereas they themselves 
contribute 52 per cent. An increase in expectations of husbands contributing from 50 to 60 
per cent would correspond with an increase in wives’ contributions from 52 to over 55 per 
cent. The coefficient of .4045 on husbands’ expectations of wives’ contributions implies 
an even larger effect. We summarise this in our next result. 
 
Result 7. Expectations of spousal contributions to the common pot are a strong determinant 
of own contributions, both for wives and for husbands. 
 
Most socio-economic characteristics are not statistically significant. There are three 
exceptions: more highly educated males contribute more, wives of older men contribute 
less, and when wives decide on spending, their husbands contribute more. Although the 
last mentioned is significant only at the 10 per cent level, it retains significance across 
estimation methods, i.e. OLS and ordered probit. Whereas in another cultural context, 
wives’ control over household finances has been found to be a potential source of husbands 
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withholding private money, and thereby potentially a source of inefficiency (Ashraf, 2009), 
we do find evidence to the contrary. 
 
Result 8. Wives controlling spending of household income is associated with husbands’ 
contributions to the household public good being higher in the experimental game. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The question we asked in this paper is: Do the effects on the efficiency of intra-household 
resource allocation of exogenously altering the control of resources vary across local 
conjugal cultures? Using a public goods game (PGG), we obtain a measure of how “good” 
husbands and wives are at realising the potential joint surplus that their marriage embodies. 
Sites were selected to encourage variation in conjugality, along a spectrum running from 
marriages resembling the unitary household model, in North India, to those resembling 
separate spheres, in West Africa.  
We find that female plus male contributions to the common pot in the experiments range 
from 47 per cent of endowments to 64 per cent, implying inefficiency of 12 – 18 per cent. 
Contributions are highest in urban North India, lowest in our two West African sites, and 
in between those two extremes in our other sites. Broadly speaking, the more separate 
decision-making is in real life, the lower spousal contributions are to the common pot in 
the experiments. 
In previous lab-in-the-field studies using married couples, giving wives control over 
resources has sometimes been found to be a source of inefficiency (Kebede et al., 2014; 
Munro et al., 2014) and sometimes to make households more efficient (Iversen et al., 2011). 
For “female control” we find a large number of robust effects: negative effects in two sites 
on male contributions, negative effects in two sites on female contributions, and negative 
effects in four sites on efficiency. However, for the Hausa, we find a robust positive effect 
of “female control”, on female contributions. For giving husbands control over resources 
(“male control”), the studies cited do not find any robust treatment effects; nor do we, in 
any site.  
The effect of female control over resources on efficiency appears to be culture-specific. 
In the Philippines, where female control over household finances is common, the absence 
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of such control appears to increase efficiency (Ashraf, 2009). The interpretation of this 
finding is that husbands have incentives to hide some of their income from their wives if 
their wives are in control of household finances (ibid.: 1267). 
In a similar vein, in PGG experiments in eastern Uganda, giving women control over 
the allocation increased both male and female contributions to the common pot (Iversen et 
al., 2011). Jackson (2013: 34) in her reflections on these findings suggests that in this 
research site, women being in charge of the common pot implies that the money in it is 
regarded as reserved for household consumption – corresponding with a well-established 
female role obligation.   
By contrast, in our sites, in which such female control over resources is rare, its 
experimentally induced presence, when it does have an effect, tends to decrease both male 
and female contributions and thereby lower household efficiency. The suppressing effect 
of “female control” on female contributions is remarkable too: for women, holding on to 
the private endowment may be safer than being seen to allocate it to oneself unless 
allocating to oneself is a well-established practice in spouses’ relations outside the 
experiment, as it clearly is among the Hausa (see references in Section 3.1). 
Overall, the strong effects for “female control”, when compared with the absence of 
effects for “male control”, suggest that transferring control to the spouse who is not 
normally in charge may be unsettling when corresponding obligations and expectations of 
obligations are not (yet) established. In theoretical terms, such interventions may increase 
the likelihood of a separate spheres equilibrium, with concomitant inefficiency, as opposed 
to the efficient income pooling one (cf. Lechene and Preston, 2011). 
 
Conflict of interest statement: On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states 
that there is no conflict of interest. 
 
1 The Maguzawa sample was smaller than originally intended; we decided to scrap some treatments not 
considered in the paper, and allocated a residue of 5 couples to the base version. 
2 The results of using OLS and ordered probit are available from the authors. These results lead to the same 
conclusions as the tobit models about which treatment effects are robust, commented on above. They also 
lead to the same conclusions about statistical significance of site dummies, expectations of the other spouse’s 
contributions and socio-economic correlates of contribution behaviour, commented on next. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of conjugality indicators by site 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria  
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural 
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa 
(HAU) 
Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
Arranged marriage (=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
.85 
.36 
 
.94 
.24 
 
.86 
.35 
 
.04 
.20 
 
.23 
.42 
 
.15 
.36 
 
.20 
.40 
 
.06 
.25 
Times married (husband, #) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
1.05 
.27 
 
1.03 
.16 
 
1 
0 
 
1.28 
.64 
 
1.61 
.94 
 
1.08 
.31 
 
1.43 
.94 
 
1.10 
.48 
Wife is primarily home maker 
(=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
.58 
.50 
 
 
.46 
.50 
 
 
.16 
.37 
 
 
.66 
.48 
 
 
.64 
.48 
 
 
.74 
.44 
 
 
.23 
.42 
 
 
.07 
.26 
Wife needs permission to buy 
dress/sari (=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
.42 
.50 
 
 
.47 
.50 
 
 
.68 
.47 
 
 
.59 
.49 
 
 
.88 
.33 
 
 
.89 
.31 
 
 
.42 
.50 
 
 
.21 
.41 
Wife primarily decides on 
spending household income 
(=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
 
.11 
.31 
 
 
 
.07 
.25 
 
 
 
 
.15 
.36 
 
 
 
.03 
.18 
 
 
 
.02 
.13 
 
 
 
.02 
.13 
 
 
 
.01 
.09 
 
 
 
0 
0 
N (number of married couples) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 
Notes: The table is based on household survey data for the 965 married couples that were randomly assigned to treatments considered in this paper (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Assignment to treatment, by site 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria   
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural  
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa (HAU) Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
All 
N (number of 
married couples) 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 965 
By game version:          
  Base 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 45 325 
  “female control” 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 320 
  “male control” 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 320 
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Table 3 
Mean values of variables capturing game behaviour and expectations, by site (Std. Dev. in parentheses) 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria   
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural  
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis 
Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa 
(HAU) 
Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
All 
Female contributions (fraction of 
endowments) 
.64 
(.31) 
.52 
(.24) 
.47 
(.20) 
.58 
(.25) 
.44 
(.26) 
.56 
(.28) 
.47 
(.21) 
.50 
(.25) 
.52 
(.26) 
Male contributions (fraction of 
endowments) 
.63 
(.27) 
.63 
(.28) 
.55 
(.20) 
.59 
(.27) 
.56 
(.27) 
.61 
(.21) 
.48 
(.27) 
.44 
(.21) 
.56 
(.26) 
Female + male contributions 
(fraction of endowments) 
.64 
(.22) 
.57 
(.19) 
.51 
(.14) 
.59 
(.21) 
.50 
(.20) 
.58 
(.21) 
.48 
(.18) 
.47 
(.15) 
.54 
(.20) 
Wife expectations of husband 
withholding (fraction of 
endowments) 
.39 
(.28) 
.50 
(.25) 
.51 
(.22) 
.48 
(.21) 
.56 
(.22) 
.60 
(.23) 
.51 
(.18) 
.50 
(.18) 
.50 
(.23) 
Husband expectations of wife 
withholding (fraction of 
endowments) 
.48 
(.27) 
.46 
(.26) 
.42 
(.19) 
.45 
(.25) 
.49 
(.25) 
.47 
(.18) 
.49 
(.18) 
.53 
(.17) 
.47 
(.23) 
          
N (number of married couples) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 965 
Notes. Expectations of spouse withholding endowment were elicited for the maximum possible endowment. Allocation to self in the “female control” and “male 
control” treatment, respectively, was elicited using a strategy method: for each possible contribution a spouse could have made, the person in charge of allocation 
was asked how they wanted to divide the common pot. The figures reported are average allocations across each possible contribution a spouse could have made.  
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Table 4 
“Female control” treatment and contributions to the common pot (percentage of endowments) 
Site Description Base Treatment t-
statistic 
P-
value 
z-
statistic 
P-
value 
India Wife mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 53.1 3.142 .002 3.031 .002 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 49.4 53.8 -.864 .391 -.793 .428 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 50.0 45.6 .961 .340 1.038 .299 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 58.8 56.9 .399 .691 .058 .953 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 53.8 34.4 3.500 .001 3.510 .000 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 64.4 49.4 2.671  .009 2.666 .008 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 43.1 53.1 -2.001  .049 -1.779 .075 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
50.0 48.1 .368  .714 -.394 .693 
India Husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 54.4 3.260 .002 3.090 .002 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 68.1 60.6 1.186 .239 1.387 .165 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 58.1 51.3 1.497 .139 1.208 .227 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.4 55.6 .653 .516 .867 .386 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 58.8 57.5 .216  .830 .392 .695 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 66.3 53.8 2.970 .004 2.420 .016 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 48.8 40.0 1.591  .116 1.297 .195 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
41.1 49.4 -2.069  .042 -1.805 .071 
India Wife + husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 53.8 4.313 .000 3.872 .000 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 58.8 57.2 .393 .696 .453 .651 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 54.1 48.4 1.842 .069 1.803 .071 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.1 56.3 .666 .507 .450 .653 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 56.3 45.9 2.727 .008 2.719 .007 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 65.3 51.6 3.319 .001 3.063 .002 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 45.9 46.6 -.150 .881 -.049 .961 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
45.6 48.8 -1.072 .287 -1.445 .148 
Notes: P-values and test statistics for a two-sided two-sample t-test and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test of the null hypothesis that for a particular site mean contributions to the common pot 
are equal in the base version and the “female control” treatment of the PGG. 
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Table 5 
“Male control” treatment and contributions to the common pot (percentage of endowments) 
Site Description Base Treatment t-
statistic 
P-
value 
z-
statistic 
P-
value 
India Wife mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 65.6 1.119  .267 .921 .357 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 49.4 51.9 -.442 .660 -.166 .868 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 50.0 44.4 1.297  .199 1.163 .245 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 58.8 59.4 -.100 .921 .005 .996 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 53.8 43.1 1.842 .069 2.112 .035 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 64.4 53.8 1.639 .105 1.518 .129 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 43.1 44.4 -.309 .758 -.269 .788 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
50.0 51.3 -.211 .834 -.623 .534 
India Husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 62.5 1.782 .079 1.696 .090 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 68.1 60.6 1.152 .253 1.330 .184 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 58.1 55.6 .597 .552 .459 .646 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.4 63.1 -.634 .528 -.359 .720 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 58.8 53.1 .891 .376 .958 .338 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 66.3 63.1 .603 .548 .502 .615 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 48.8 56.3 -1.239 .219 -1.468 .142 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
41.1 42.5 -.295 .769 .665 .506 
India Wife + husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 64.1 1.933 .057 1.763 .078 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Rural, North 58.8 56.3 .545 .588 .759 .448 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 54.1 50.0 1.362 .177 1.321 .187 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.1 61.3 -.431 .668 -.005 .996 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 56.3 48.1 1.751 .084 2.276 .023 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 65.3 58.4 1.386 .170 1.560 .118 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 45.9 50.3 -1.145 .256 -1.241 .215 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
45.6 46.9 -.362 .718 -.555 .579 
Notes: P-values and test statistics for a two-sided two-sample t-test and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test of the null hypothesis that for a particular site mean contributions to the common pot 
are equal in the base version and the “female control” treatment of the PGG. 
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Table 6 
Regression analysis of spouses’ contribution behaviour (tobit model) 
 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
Varanasi (VAR) .2920*** 
(.0855) 
.2283*** 
(.0842) 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) .0390 
(.0654) 
.1414 
(.1194) 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) .1025* 
(.0546) 
.0187 
(.0821) 
Addis Ababa (ADI) .1502** 
(.0624) 
.0295 
(.0843) 
Mehal Meda (MHM) .1743** 
(.0808) 
.1093 
(.1031) 
Hadiya (HAD) .2603** 
(.1224) 
.1485 
(.0932) 
Hausa (HAU) (omitted)   
Maguzawa (MAG) .1729 
(.1417) 
-.1023 
(.0710) 
VAR x “female control” (FC) -.2203*** 
(.0798) 
-.2312*** 
(.0458) 
UPR x FC .0950 
(.0726) 
-.0370 
(.0965) 
TAM x FC -.0765 
(.0572) 
-.0853 
(.0746) 
ADI x FC -.0345 
(.0593) 
-.0323 
(.0609) 
MHM x FC -.2420*** 
(.0867) 
-.0190 
(.0828) 
HAD x FC -.1296 
(.1268) 
-.1267** 
(.0524) 
HAU x FC .0971** 
(.0439) 
-.1341* 
(.0656) 
MAG x FC -.1084 
(.1340) 
.0560 
(.0557) 
VAR x “male control” (MC) -.0457 
(.1505) 
-.0974 
(.1060) 
UPR x MC -.0808 
(.0666) 
.0038 
(.1344) 
TAM x MC -.0900*** 
(.0204) 
-.0089 
(.0336) 
ADI x MC -.0556 
(.0656) 
.0578 
(.0675) 
MHM x MC -.1372 
(.1069) 
-.1053 
(.1046) 
HAD x MC -.0953 
(.2067) 
-.0391 
(.0777) 
HAU x MC .0756 
(.0629) 
-.0231 
(.0963) 
MAG x MC -.1173 
(.1247) 
.0513 
(.0564) 
Female age in years .0023 
(.0018) 
-.0021 
(.0016) 
Male age in years -.0026* 
(.0014) 
.0016 
(.0013) 
Female education in years -.0007 .0053 
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 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
(.0034) (.0035) 
Male education in years .0032 
(.0027) 
.0070** 
(.0032) 
Arranged marriage (=1) -.0194 
(.0294) 
-.0020 
(.0336) 
Times married (husband, #) -.0025 
(.0160) 
-.0007 
(.0184) 
Wife is primarily home maker (=1) .0055 
(.0256) 
-.0057 
(.0203) 
Wife needs permission to buy dress/sari (=1) .0008 
(.0209) 
.0166 
(.0233) 
Wife primarily decides on spending 
household income (=1) 
.0306 
(.0395) 
.0580* 
(.0348) 
Wife expectations of husband withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.3350*** 
(.0558) 
-.0173 
(.0479) 
Husband expectations of wife withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.1072* 
(.0633) 
-.4045*** 
(.0720) 
   
Constant .6648*** 
(.0834) 
.6709*** 
(.0857) 
Pseudo R-squared .2458 .2881 
N 847 847 
Notes: Censored regression analysis (tobit model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and 
clustered at the session level. *** indicates significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level. The 
lower N than all participating couples reflect missing values for some of the control variables. 
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Fig. 1. Control and mean contributions to the common pot by site (w-wife; h-husband) 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
  
This online appendix contains a sample experimental script. 
 
Experimental Instructions1 
 
[STEP 1: General introduction] 
 
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce EXPERIMENTERS 
and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today’s programme. We have 
invited you here because we want to learn about how married couples in this area take 
decisions. All of you are going to be asked to do a task for money. We will then ask each 
of you what you want to do with the money you earn. Whatever money you gain today will 
be yours to keep. You will be asked very simple questions. Questions that do not have a 
correct answer, they are just about the way you think. For example, what is your favourite 
colour [ask someone in the room]? We cannot say that this answer is right or wrong. It is 
just your opinion and it can be different from the opinion of others in this room. However 
it is important to think seriously about your answers because they will affect how much 
money you will take home. 
 
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we want to make a 
few things clear. First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a research organization, 
and this money has been given to us for research. Secondly, this is a study about how you 
make decisions. Therefore you should not talk with others. This is very important. Please 
be sure to obey this rule because it is possible for one person to spoil the activity for 
everyone. I’m afraid that if we find you talking with others, we will have to send you home, 
and you will not be able to earn any money here today. Of course, if you have questions, 
you can ask one of us. Thirdly, the study has two parts: today’s exercise is one, but we will 
also visit you in your homes in the coming weeks to ask both the husband and the wife a 
                                                 
1 These are for the treatment female control in Ethiopia. The instructions for other treatments and other 
countries are identical apart from fairly obvious modifications. 
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number of questions. Finally, make sure that you listen carefully to us. You will be able to 
make a good amount of money here today, and it is important that the instructions are clear 
for you so that you can follow them. 
 
 
[Instructions for wives]2 
 
[STEP 2: Wives in a separate room – “Treatment Instructions” - To be read to ALL wives 
at the same time] 
 
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary 
between people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the 
envelope.] Your husband will receive a similar envelope and he will also receive an amount 
of money between Birr 0 and Birr 40. He doesn’t know how much you have in your 
envelope and you won’t be told how much he has in his envelope.  
 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how much to leave 
in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. Your husband will be making 
the same decision with his envelope. You can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 
or Birr 40 out of the envelope. Other amounts are not allowed. So please remember: you 
can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 or Birr 40 out. 
 
After you have made your decision and your husband has made his decision we will bring 
you together again. We will put all the money that you and your husband have left in your 
envelopes into one envelope. We call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in the 
common envelope we will add another half again. So, if there are Birr 20 in the common 
envelope we will add another Birr 10 to make the total Birr 30. If there are Birr 80 in the 
common envelope we will add another Birr 40 to make a total of Birr 120 and so on.  
 
Both of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
 
                                                 
2 Instructions for husbands appear later in the document.  
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After that you will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. You have to 
decide how much to give to your husband and how much to keep for yourself. 
 
In a moment we will give you some time to think about how much money you want to 
leave in your envelope. After you have made your decision, we will ask you some questions 
about how you want to divide the money in the common envelope between yourself and 
your husband. 
 
[STEP 3: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – “Control Questions”] 
 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the instructions. 
1. If you have Birr 40 in your envelope and you take out Birr 20 how much will be 
left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct participant if necessary] 
2. If you put Birr 20 into the common envelope and your husband puts in Birr 20 how 
much will there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is Birr 40 in the common envelope?  
4. How much will you receive if there is Birr 60 in the common envelope?   
 
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary]3 
 
[STEP 4: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – “Making the decision 1” - Once 
the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the activity, give HER THE 
ENVELOPE AND some time to make her decision IN PRIVATE. Don’t forget to write 
down the decision in the data entry sheet.] 
 
                                                 
3 [Responses to common questions: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE USED ONLY IN CASE 
PEOPLE ASK.]  
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wife will have the same amounts in their envelopes, 
answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your decision and I am not 
allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them precisely. E.g if I put in Birr 40 
and my husband puts in nothing how much will you add to the total?’ Answer: Birr 20. 
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[STEP 5: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has taken the 
decision, continue reading the instructions] 
 
[Continuation of instructions for wives] 
 
You have left Birr [Y] in the envelope. In a few minutes we will put the money into one 
envelope, the common envelope.  
 
[For the questions which follow, read off the amounts from these tables.  
 
Amount added to common pool 
Y↓ Husband→ 0 10 20 30 40 
0 0 5 10 15 20 
10 5 10 15 20 25 
20 10 15 20 25 30 
30 15 20 25 30 35 
40 20 25 30 35 40 
 
 
Total amount in the common pool 
Y↓ Husband→ 0 10 20 30 40 
0 0 15 30 45 60 
10 15 30 45 60 75 
20 30 45 60 75 90 
30 45 60 75 90 105 
40 60 75 90 105 120 
 
1. Remember: if your husband put no Birr into the envelope, we add Birr [0.5Y] to 
the Birr [Y] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr [1.5Y] 
in the common envelope.  
 
2. If your husband put Birr 10 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [10 +Y] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope.  
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3. If your husband put Birr 20 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+ 20] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
 
4. If your husband put Birr 30 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+30] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
 
5. If your husband put Birr 40 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+40] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
 
[STEP 6: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY –“Making the decision 2”] 
 
You now have to decide how to split the money for each of these possibilities. You cannot 
change your mind later on.  
 
1. If your husband put Birr 0 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
 
2. If your husband put Birr 10 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
 
3. If your husband put Birr 20 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
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4. If your husband put Birr 30 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
 
5. If your husband put Birr 40 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
 
Is there any answer that you would like to change?  
 
[Review and change as is necessary] 
 
[STEP 7: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has taken the 
decision, conduct post-experiment questionnaire] 
 
1. If your husband had Birr 40 in his envelope, how much do you think he would take out? 
 
Thank you. We will now rejoin you and your husband and put the money from your two 
envelopes into the common envelope.  
 
[Bring husband and wife together & resolve the game.] 
 
[Experimenter looks up the allocation decision and executes it. Subjects are given their 
money and thanked] 
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[Instructions for husbands] 
 
[STEP 2: Husbands in a separate room – “Treatment Instructions” - To be read to ALL 
husbands at the same time] 
  
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary 
between people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the 
envelope.] Your wife will receive a similar envelope and she will also receive an amount 
of money between Birr 0 and Birr 40. She doesn’t know how much you have in your 
envelope and you won’t be told how much she has in her envelope.  
 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how much to leave 
in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. Your wife will be making the 
same decision with her envelope. You can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 or 
Birr 40 out of the envelope. Other amounts are not allowed. So please remember: you can 
only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 or Birr 40 out. 
 
After you have made your decision and your wife has made her decision we will bring you 
together again. We will put all the money that you and your wife have left in your envelopes 
into one envelope. We call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in the common 
envelope we will add another half again. So, if there are Birr 20 in the common envelope 
we will add another Birr 10 to make the total Birr 30. If there are Birr 80 in the common 
envelope we will add another Birr 40 to make a total of Birr 120 and so on.  
 
Both of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
 
After that your wife will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. She has 
to decide how much to give to you and how much to keep for herself. In a moment we will 
give you some time to think about how much money you want to leave in your envelope.  
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[STEP 3: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – “Control Questions”] 
 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the instructions. 
1. If you have Birr 40 in your envelope and you take out Birr 20 how much will be 
left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct participant if necessary] 
2. If you put Birr 20 into the common envelope and your wife puts in Birr 20 how 
much will there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is Birr 40 in the common envelope?  
 
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary]4 
 
[STEP 4: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – “Decision Making” - Once 
the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the activity, GIVE HIM THE 
ENVELOPE AND some time to make his decision IN PRIVATE. Don’t forget to write 
down the decision in the data entry sheet.] 
 
[STEP 5: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has taken 
the decision, conduct post-experiment questionnaire] 
 
1. If your wife had Birr 40 in her envelope, how much do you think she would take out? 
 
Thank you. We will now rejoin your wife and put the money from your two envelopes into 
the common envelope.  
 
[Resolution and payment as per above.] 
                                                 
4 [Responses to common questions: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE USED ONLY IN 
CASE PEOPLE ASK.]  
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wife will have the same amounts in their envelopes, 
answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your decision and I am not 
allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them precisely. E.g if I put in Birr 40 
and my wife puts in nothing how much will you add to the total?’ Answer: Birr 20. 
 
